ABSTRACT Learners may not be motivated to actively participate in the stages of learning. This paper aims to motivate learners to get effectively involved in the learning process, i.e., they learn both directly from an instructor and by learning from and teaching each other in an interactive manner. Hence, we introduce a game with a purpose that motivates learners to become involved in the learning process to effectively improve their learning performance. In order to meet the mentioned objective, this paper proposes a gametheoretic approach based on explanation and competition, which uses competitive learning and explanatory techniques. In this game, the learners are encouraged to compete for more beneficial explanations of educational concepts. We also use rewards and punishments as a means of encouraging learners to provide efficient explanations. We then apply game theoretic concepts to analyze the defined parameters in the proposed game for a Nash equilibrium that leads learners to have stronger motivations for providing good explanations. The statistical analysis of experimental results using the Student's t-test indicates that the proposed game drives the learners to participate actively in different learning stages and helps them to improve their knowledge more efficiently.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research into the social context of learning has revealed that peer involvement in learning can affect both effective education and learners' interest and motivation [1] - [5] . Alongside learning from their instructors, students are more likely to also learn from their peers [2] , [6] , [7] . Hence, the teaching process can be complemented by other classroom activities [1] in which learners interact with each other in a cooperative or competitive atmosphere.
In a collaborative environment, learners are categorized into small groups that work together so that each learner's achievement depends on that of the group. In a competitive environment, when a learner realizes in his/her goal, the other learners may fail to achieve their objectives [7] , [8] .
Several studies have been performed in order to determine which learning style, cooperative or competitive, is more workable in different circumstances [2] , [6] , [9] .
Plass et al. [2] have suggested that in developing analytical skills, competitive learning is more beneficial than individual and cooperative learning styles.
Learning through explanation is another type of classroom activity that plays an important role in triggering learning improvement [10] , [11] . Indeed, explanation can help learners extract a pattern from a given set of factual circumstances in a given subject. The user can then use the obtained pattern to solve problems under a different set of factual circumstances [10] . As an example, explaining how a × b is calculated, may create a pattern that explains multiplying 'a' by 'b' as the addition of 'a's for 'b' times [10] .
In this study, we aim to motivate learners to get actively involved in the learning process; both while learning on a regular basis from an instructor and trying to learn from the other learners interactively. To achieve this objective, we've designed a game with the purpose of propting learning that motivate learners to get involved in competitive learning, based on interactive explanations. Designing a game with a purpose (GWAP) is known as a facet of human computation that seeks to elicit useful computational work as a multi-player game [12] , [13] . We apply the game-theoretic approach to obtain the Nash Equilibrium (NE) that leads to learning improvement. The learners may not be sufficiently motivated to learn from or teach the other learners. Therefore, NE can be used as a suitable framework to improve learning process by predicting a reliable outcome.
Our study differs from that described as gamification; that is, the applications of game design elements in non-game contexts [14] - [16] . Gamification results in positive effects [17] such as increasing students' engagement [18] , improving learning outcomes [19] , and helping students obtain better scores [20] . Our work, however, focuses on the use of game theory, thus enabling a mathematical model to improve the students learning experience. This paper has three major contributions: First, we've designed a game with a purpose (GWAP) of prompting learning improvements that drives learners to compete for more beneficial explanations of an educational concept. Second, we investigate the situations that motivate learners to take part in this kind of competition. We also use reward and punishment as a means of encouraging learners to provide efficient explanations. In other words, the more efficient the explanations are, the more learning improvement will be experienced by the other learners. Finally, we apply a comprehensive game-theoretical analysis to determine the values of reward and punishment, which can motivate learners to explain more efficiently.
An experiment has been concluded to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach. For this purpose, we asked the instructor of the ''Compiler Construction'' course to select some learners randomly. We used some selected concepts from the course in our experiment.
The research questions for this study are:
• Is there any improvement in the experimental group compared to the control group in terms of the learning concepts used in this experiment?
• Is there any significant difference between the experimental and the control groups' result to learning concepts not used in this experiment?
• In the experimental group, is there a significant difference between the results gained from the concepts used in our experiment and those not used in our experiment? The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief review on related work about competitive learning and explanation. Section III describes the methodology and the details of the proposed game. In this section, we also analyze the Nash Equilibrium profile that can improve the learning process. The evaluation and results of its implementation are described in Section IV. Finally in Section V, we discuss our conclusions and future work.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW A. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
Johnson and Johnson [8] stated that instruction can be designed to be cooperative, competitive, or individualistic. A considerable amount of literature has been published on investigating which of these methods are preferred. However, some researchers have suggested that none of the approaches are good enough by themselves, and so recommend a rational and balance combination of the approaches [6] .
Some studies such as [21] - [24] have focused on cooperative learning, and how to form groups [25] - [27] . There are also other studies that have focused on competitive learning. As an example, Burguillo [28] uses competitive learning to improve performance and motivation in learning. Another example is Plass et al. [2] which uses competition to improve learners' analytic skills. Moreover, Chauhan [6] explains the requirements of a fruitful competition event.
For instance, in a well-designed competition, competitors have positive attitudes towards each other, have a desire to contribute and learn, and have a definite set of aims to achieve; while realizing that not all of them can be winners [6] .
B. GAME THEORY IN A LEARNING CONTEXT
Currently, studies have been undertaken on the study of game theory in a learning context. For instance, it has been used to investigate the effect of strict or lenient scoring on increased or decreased effort of learners or instructors [29] ; to study the impact of the number of learners in a class on their success [30] , [31] ; to model effort from the instructors and learners [32] ; to model the interaction between instructors and learners [33] ; to model participatory or competitor behavior between instructors [34] ; to evaluate learners' cooperative behavior [35] , [36] ; and to create competition among learners [28] .
Jain et al. [37] provide a game-theoretical model for Yahoo! Answers and examine the equilibrium under the current scoring rule with the aim of increasing the equilibrium efficiency under a new set of scoring rules. In our approach, the learners are encouraged to give more effective and useful explanations. De Mars [38] employs a game-theoretic approach to model incentive and contribution behavior on crowdsourcing platforms. In crowdsourcing, the contributors (who are the creators of learning content) may choose whether or not to participate, create a course, and earn the associated reward.
Our work focuses on learning improvement via competitive learning and concentrates on the analysis of the game by finding the NE that improves learning.
III. METHODOLOGY
The purpose of G-TEC is to stimulate learners to take part in a competition to provide more useful explanations. We employ the game-theoretical approach to analyze the parameters' value in a desired NE. Game theory provides mathematical models of conflict and collaboration between intelligent rational decisionmakers [39] . It can offer insights into areas such as the economy [40] , politics [41] , networks [42] , and social contacts [41] , [43] . A game is characterized by a number of players who interact and choose a strategy from their strategy sets, and eventually receive some payoff (utility) as a reward or punishment based on a defined payoff matrix. We use s i to denote the selected strategy of learner i combined with his/her strategy set S i , and s −i to denote the selected strategies of the opponents, who are learners other than player i. A set of selected strategies of all learners is called a strategy profile.
In order to clarify the strategic behavior of learners, some game theoretic concepts are defined below.
Definition 1: The best response of a player is the strategy (or strategies) that produces the greatest payoff for the player given the strategies that other players adopt.
If a strategy profile exists in which each player has chosen the mutual best response, then no one has a motivation to deviate from the given strategy profile. A strategy profile of this type constitutes a Nash Equilibrium [44] , [45] :
Definition 2: The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is a strategy profile in which each player has selected the best response (or one of the best responses) in response to the other players' strategies. Figure 1 shows an example in which player 1 and player 2 have strategy set S 1 = {a, b} and S 2 = {c, d}, respectively. Strategy profile (a, d) describes choosing strategy the choice of strategy a by player 1 and strategy c by player 2 that results in payoff 5 for player 1 and 0 for player 2. In this game, for example, if player 2 chooses c, player 1 obtains payoff 2 by choosing strategy a and payoff 0 by choosing strategy b, so a is the best response to c.
John Nash has shown that at least one mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium will exist for any finite game [46] . Some points have been mentioned regarding NE, including:
• Since each player selects his/her best response to the other players' choices, NE can be seen as an outcome of mutual best responses.
• The NE definition states that, no player can increase his/her payoff by deviating unilaterally.
• Accordingly, no player regrets his/her action when they play in a NE.
• Due to a lack of knowledge by the learners, some players may not play NE. The proposed approach can be used as a mechanism to encourage players to play NE strategies.
A. A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH BASED ON EXPLANATION AND COMPETITION(G-TEC)
Due to the powerful effects of explanation [10] and competition [6] on learning, we have designed a game theoretical mechanism based on these two tools in order to enhance learning outcomes. It should be mentioned that inappropriate explanations can impair learning [10] . During our mechanism execution, the instructor monitors the learners' explanations to avoid misleading ones.
On the other hand, competition may be destructive [6] and a successful competition event needs some criteria. For instance, in a well-designed competition, competitors have positive attitudes towards each other, have a desire to contribute and learn, and have a definite set of aims to achieve; while realizing that not all of them can winners [6] . In our mechanism, we use score as a reward to encourage learners to actively participate in the mechanism. Learners are classmates and learning is their common aim, so it is assumed that they'll have positive attitudes towards each other that will trigger learning improvement.
Our mechanism, G-TEC, is a game where the players are N learners (students). In G-TEC, T questions about a concept will be asked from players during T iterations. In each iteration t (1 ≤ t ≤ T ), learners should answer a question individually. The questions are arranged from easy to hard, and the learners get rewarded for their correct answers and miss gaining scores as a punishment for incorrect answers.
A volunteer is selected among those players who have answered correctly in this iteration. If no volunteer exists, a player will be selected randomly. The volunteer is hereafter referred to as the pivot player. The pivot should explain his/her answer properly.
In the next iteration, another question will be shown by the instructor. All learners answer the new question and get a reward/punishment for correct/incorrect answers. In this iteration, the pivot that explained the previous question, will obtain a positive score based on the number of players who answered incorrectly in the previous iteration and have answered correctly in the current iteration. He/she takes a negative score based on the number of players who answered correctly in the previous iteration but have answered incorrectly in the present iteration. The mechanism will continue by choosing a new pivot for this stage's question and then asking the learners another question. Figure 2 shows the stages of our proposed mechanism.
Indeed, G-TEC has two important purposes: encouraging learners to provide correct answers and to provide proper explanations. If no user answers correctly during a given iteration, a simpler question (instead of a harder one) will be asked, and no pivot will be chosen. In fact, the iterations with no correct answer will be similar to the first iteration. Algorithm 1 summarizes the whole G-TEC process. In all G-TEC iterations, the players can play a proactive role by answering questions correctly and explaining efficiently, or take a passive role by not attempting to answer properly.
Learner's differing behaviors (to be active or passive in answering the questions and explaining the concepts) constitute the strategy set of G-TEC, in which each behavior maps onto a single strategy. Figure 3 shows the extensive form of G-TEC between a sample learner P 1 and a pivot P iv . Table 1 summarizes the definitions of symbols throughout the paper.
We use ''C'' to refer to a learner's attempt to provide a correct answer, and ''I'' to present a learner's careless answering of the question. We also use ''G'' to show a pivot's effort to provide a careful and good explanation, and ''B'' to display carelessness in providing a good explanation.
Based on Figure 3 , point 1 is the first information set of P 1 that consists of {C, I }. An information set consists of a set of actions at each choice node. At this point, learner P 1 can attempt to answer correctly in order to receive a higher positive score. If he/she doesn't make sufficient effort, he/she may answer incorrectly. After selecting a pivot, he/she may attempt to present a good explanation or he/she may not care about the explanation and present a bad explanation. The pivot is not aware of others' answers; hence point 2 is one of the pivot information sets consisting of {G, B}.
Show question t to learners.
3:
for each player i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , N ) do 5: Get/obtain reward/punishment based on his/her correct/incorrect answer. 6: end for 7: else 8: for each player i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , N ) do 9: if i is not pivot of iteration t − 1 then 10: Get/obtain reward/punishment based on the player and pivot answer. Get/obtain reward/punishment based on his/her answer. 13: Get/obtain extra positive/negative scores for good/not enough good 14: explanation. 15: end if 16: end for 17: end if 18: Select a Pivot for explanation 19: end for After the pivot's explanation, another question is shown to learners so that the learners (including the pivot) respond to the question individually. P 1 is not informed of explanation quality, but he/she knows his/her choice in the last question. Hence, he/she knows whether he/she is at point 3 or point 4. Hence, he/she has one information set at point 3, and another at point 4. The pivot answers the question simultaneously with others, so he/she is not aware of the other answers. He/she is also not aware of his/her explanation's quality. So there is one information set at point 5, and another at point 6.
Hence, for P 1 there are three information sets including {C, I } at point 1, {C, I } at point 3, and {C, I } at point 4.
The pivot also has three such information sets as {G, B} at point 2, {C, I } at point 5, and {C, I } at point 6. The leaves of extensive form represent the payoff of learners and the pivot (as a volunteer learner for explanation). There are two exceptions. For the first question, as there is no pre-existing question and pivot, no extra score needs to be calculated. Another note is about the last question is that because no questions remain, no pivot is chosen for this question. Table 2 shows a simplified payoff matrix of Figure 3 . The strategy set of learner P1 is {CC, CI , IC, II }. For example, ''C'' means the learner has correctly answered to question t and t + 1, and ''CI'' means the learner has answered question t correctly and question t + 1 incorrectly. The strategy set of the pivot is {GC, GI , BC, BI }. For instance, the strategy ''GC'' means the pivot has presented a good explanation for question t, and has correctly answered question t + 1. Appendix A describes in more detail about converting extensive form through the payoff matrix.
B. LEARNERS AND PIVOT SCORING METHOD

In each iteration t, R[t] and P[t]
stand for rewarding correct answer and punishing an incorrect answer respectively. We also consider players' activities in giving rewards and punishments. For example, if a learner cannot answer question t but can answer question t + 1, we try to encourage his/her efforts. So this learner receives 2R[t + 1] instead of R[t + 1]. On the other hand, when a learner gives a correct answer to question t and an incorrect answer to question t +1, we investigate the pivot's answer that explained question t. If this pivot answers question t + 1 incorrectly, it may be due to the fact that their explanation isn't good enough and misleads the learner. In this case, the learner's punishment will be calculated as
In Table 2 , E GC and E GI refer to the pivot's extra scores when he tries to present a good explanation. The value of E GC defines the extra score when the pivot answers question t + 1 correctly, and E GI defines the amount of scores when he/she answers question t + 1 incorrectly.
We consider N IC as a measure of good explanation's positive effect and N CI as a measure of an insufficient explanation's negative effect. N CI [ 
, we infer that the pivot was careless in providing an explanation. We use the following formula to calculate E GC and E GI :
N C defines the number of players that have answered question number t +1 correctly, and N I defines the number of players that have answered question number t +1 incorrectly. As mentioned before, we will encourage the pivot to present a more careful explanation and avoid reckless descriptions. For this purpose, we assign more positive scores for a good explanation than negative marks for a bad explanation. For this purpose, an exponential relation has been considered between a good explanation and its positive impact, i.e., the number of learners who gained learning improvement. We use N IC as a criterion of a good explanation's effect, and N CI as a criterion of a bad explanation's effect. So, we use the N IC to N C ratio as the positive score of a good explanation. As mentioned above, we use the exponential function of N IC to emphasize the positive effect.
Since the bad or insufficient explanation of the pivot might exert an influence on incorrect answers by other learners, the pivot may get a negative score based on the value of
We use E B as a punishment value for an insufficiently good explanation:
In fact, we use N CI to N I ratio as the negative score of a bad explanation.
C. REWARD AND PUNISHMENT DURING ITERATIONS
Before starting the game, the instructor defines the values for reward and punishment. We call these initial values R [1] and P [1] respectively, and use them as reward and punishment in the first iteration of the game. In the following iterations
T )P [1] to set the values for reward and punishment. In our proposed mechanism, we expect learning improvement during iterations. Hence, the scores gained during the early iterations are higher than those gained later, and the gained scores decrease as the learning iteration continues.
For instance, consider the case where T = 10. This means that there will be 10 questions, and the reward for a correct answer in iteration 1, 2, 3, . . . , 10 is R [1] , 0.9R [1] , 0.8R [1] , . . . , 0.1R [1] , respectively. The changes in punishment values are different. The punishment considered for incorrect answers increases as the iterations continue. For instance in T = 10, the punishment of iter- ation 1, 2, 3, . . . , 10 is P[1], 1.1P[1], 1.2P[1] , . . . , 1.9P [1] respectively.
In G-TEC, a pivot will also receive a positive mark, based on N CI , while he/she is even unable to answer correctly during iteration t. In this case, he/she gets P[t] for an incorrect answer, and a score for an explanation given an amount of N CI . That is because his/her incorrect answer may be due to carelessness rather than lack of knowledge. In these situations, the positive score is less than the case in which the pivot can answer question t correctly.
Since there is no pivot before the first iteration, all learners will obtain a reward R [1] for any correct answer or take punishment P [1] for any incorrect answer, and there are no extra positive or negative scores for the first iteration.
D. NASH EQUILIBRIUM CONDITION
We will prove that there will be a given value of reward and punishment that encourages players to stay in NE leading to learning improvement. The following theorem presents the required condition for the existence of NE in G-TEC.
Theorem 1: In G-TEC, allocating a reward three times equal to or bigger than the punishment provides enough motivation for learners to play in NE.
Proof: The proof is given in appendix B. Theorem 1 indicates that by choosing the appropriate value for reward and punishment, the strategy profiles (IC, GC) will be the NE for G-TEC. This strategy profile prompts the pivot to answer correctly and then explain better. It also provokes the other players to learn from the pivot's explanation and answer correctly, even if they have answered incorrectly in the previous iteration. This is the very objective we are seeking.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Aiming to evaluate the proposed game, we explain the results of an implementation of G-TEC. Figure 4 displays the steps of our experiment.
A. INITIALIZATION 1) PARTICIPANT GROUPING INTO EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL
We selected 27 undergraduate learners of computer science who took the ''Compiler Construction'' course. All learners were taught all ''Compiler Construction'' course concepts in a class. We divided the learners into an experimental group and a control group. The experimental group VOLUME 6, 2018 included 15 students, consisting of 9 females and 6 males, and ages from 21 to 24 with an average age of 22.37. The experimental group refersto those learners who participated in G-TEC. We selected the members of the experimental group randomly. The control group included 12 students, consisting of 6 females and 6 males, and ages from 21 to 24 with an average age of 22.25. These learners did not participate in G-TEC. We used the control group to investigate the effect of G-TEC on the experimental group. Table 3 summarizes the experimental and control group specification.
2) INSTRUCTIONAL CONCEPTS SELECTION
Before the program began, an instructor prepared some multiple-choice questions about the defined concepts of the course. The multiple-choice questions make it possible to test learners' understanding of a much greater portion than can be done in the same time by getting learners to write in detail [47] . The questions were arranged from easy to hard.
We performed the mechanism three times for three different selected concepts of a ''Compiler Construction'' course. The selected concepts were ''First Concept'', ''Follow Concept'', and ''LL Grammar''. Each selected concept covered a separate part of the course. So, based on instructor experience and instructional aspects, different numbers of questions were prepared for each concept. Table 4 shows the number of questions prepared for each concept.
For these concepts, the learners needed to use their analytical skills. 
3) REWARD AND PUNISHMENT SETTING
As said in Theorem 1, in order to motivate the learner, the reward for correct answers should be three times more than that of the punishment. In our experiment, a reward value of 3 and a punishment value of 1 were considered. As mentioned earlier, we used R Table 5 shows all the rewards and punishments that learners could obtain for questions 1-8. The whole obtained scores of the iterations were considered as a part of each learners' final grade. Moreover, the pivot can obtain a higher score based on his/her explanation. We also added these scores to the obtained scores.
B. RUNNING G-TEC ON EXPERIMENTAL GROUP
After the learners' grouping, we ran the G-TEC on experimental group (As described in Figure 2 and Algorithm 1). Then, we used a learning curve as a means of evaluating of the experimental group's learning improvement. In this paper, the term ''learning curve'' is used to refer to the value of N C [t] during different iterations of G-TEC. The questions are arranged from easy to hard. So, it seems reasonable to assume that the proposed mechanism will improve learning if the value of N C [t] remains equal or increases during the iterations. We investigated the efficiency of G-TEC from another aspect as well. For this purpose, we use a post-test from the ''Compiler Construction'' course to compare the 53690 VOLUME 6, 2018 Each learner can compete against others to take the opportunity to explain his/her answer and obtain higher scores in addition to what he/she has obtained through answering correctly. Hence, learners should try to answer correctly, compete for selection, and then explain properly and completely to obtain higher scores.
As mentioned earlier, explanations may be detrimental to learning when the extracted patterns are misleading or violated by exceptions [10] . The instructor can avoid this problem by interrupting an incorrect explanation and selecting another volunteer.
C. RESULTS
As Figure 4 shows, we use the Learning Curve and Posttest to evaluate G-TEC's effect on learning improvement. The following subsections present the results.
1) ANALYSING LEARNING CURVE OF THE EXPERIMENTAL GROUP
We use the number of correct answers, N C [t], as a measure of leaning improvement. In this paper, the term ''learning curve'' is used to refer to the value of N C [t] during different iterations. Figure 5 shows the learning curve of the tested concepts.
The ''First Concept'' has the highest value of standard deviation, mainly because of the value of N C [8] = 7, and N C [9] = 7. We reviewed the questions 8 and 9, and found that they were much harder than question 7. Although N C [8] and N C [9] were expected to remain equal or to be higher than N C [7] , a considerable decrease was observed.
Ignoring N C [8] and N C [9] , we see that the N C [t] was almost uniform during the iterations.
As Figure 5 shows, the learning curve of the concepts ''Follow Concept'' and ''LL Grammar'' are almost uniform. Hence, we conclude that the proposed mechanism has improved the learning of the learners.
2) GIVING A POST-TEST TO THE EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS
In addition to the learning curve, we give a post-test to all learners both those who participated (experimental group) and those who did not participate (control group) in the game and then, we will compare the results of the experimental learners with those of the control learners. If the experimental learners have better results, the proposed mechanism is successful and able to improve learning. For this purpose, 27 learners, including 15 experimental learners and 12 control learners, are given an exam with 25 multiplechoice questions. The questions are about all the concepts from the selected course and are created by the instructor.
The post-test consisted of two groups of concepts:
• Group A: This group contained 10 questions about the concepts used in our experiment. Hence, Group A contained questions about ''First Concept'', ''Follow Concept'', and ''LL Grammar''.
• Group B: The remaining 15 questions of the post-test were about other concepts of the ''Compiler Construction'' course not used in our experiment. It should be mentioned that learners, both control and experimental, were taught about all of the course concepts. Table 6 indicates the related concept of Group A in the post-test questions, and the number of correct answers for each question in both the experimental and control groups.
As the numbers of learners in the two groups are different, we calculated the relative number of correct answers by VOLUME 6, 2018 dividing the number of correct answers by the number of members of each group, as shown in the two last columns of Table 6 .
The last row of Table 6 shows the average of relative numbers for the correct answers of the experimental and control group. The average in the experimental group was higher than the control group. In the present paper, we use Student's t-test (t-test) to investigate whether this result is significant.
Student's t-test, in statistics, is a technique of testing a hypothesis about the mean of a small sample of a normally distributed population when the population's standard deviation is unknown.
In this study, we compare the learning improvement of the experimental and control groups; hence, we have two independent groups, and we should use the independent samples t-test.
Independent samples t-test is a parametric statistical test that compares the performance of two different samples of participants. It indicates whether the two samples are similar enough to conclude that they are alike, or whether they are so different that they can be concluded to be from two different populations [48] . In order to apply the t-test, the variables should be normal [48] . We use MiniTab for the normality test and also the t-test. For example, Figure 6 shows the normality test on the results of the Group A questions for both the experimental and control groups using MiniTab. It performs a hypothesis test to examine whether the observations follow a normal distribution. For this test, the hypotheses are:
H 0 : data follow a normal distribution H 1 : data do not follow a normal distribution The null hypothesis will be rejected as the p-value is lower than alpha (α) level, meaning that the data is highly abnormal. Note that the p-value is the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis. The most commonly used α level is 0.05 [48] , used as the alpha level in this paper.
For instance, Figure 6 .a shows the normality test of the relative number of correct answers of the experimental learners in Group A of questions. This figure indicates that the calculated p-value equals 0.902 which is greater than 0.05. So, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis, and consequently, the data is assumed to be normal. The p-value of a normality test on the relative numbers of correct answers for the control learners is 0.128, so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Thus this data can be assumed to be normal.
To examine the effect of our mechanism on learning improvement, we investigate three questions for the posttest's results: 1) Is there any improvement in the experimental group compared to the control group in terms of the questions in Group A? 2) Is there any significant difference between the experimental and control groups' results for the Group B' questions? 3) In the experimental group, is there a significant difference between the results for the Group A and Group B questions? Figure 7 states the results of the independent t-test using MiniTab. It performs a hypothesis test:
H 0 : µ 2 = µ 1 H 1 : µ 2 = µ 1 Parameters µ 2 and µ 1 are the mean of the experimental and the control group respectively. In other words, H 0 clarifies that there is no significant difference between the means; and H 1 states the difference is significant. According to the results, if the p-value becomes less than the alpha level, the null hypothesis will be rejected. We will fail to reject the null hypothesis if the p-value is greater than the alpha level, 53692 VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 7. T-test by use of MiniTab. The p-value is 0.035, which is lower than the considered alpha value. This small p-value suggests that the data is inconsistent with H 0 , and H 0 is rejected. Therefore, H 1 is confirmed and there is a significant difference between the two means. indicating that there is a significant difference in the mean of the two groups.
According to Table 7 , we answer the three questions:
1) The t-test between the experimental and control groups (in questions of Group A) gives p-value=0.035. This value is lower than the defined alpha level, so the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, a significant difference is observed in the results of experimental and control groups in questions of Group A. As Table 7 demonstrates, the mean scores of the experimental group (0.56) are higher than those of the control group (0.38). It indicates that G-TEC is a practical mechanism with a positive effect on learning improvement. 2) The t-test between the experimental and control groups in the questions about concepts not used in the implementation gave a p-value equal to 0.557. This p-value was higher than the determined alpha level, so we were unable to reject the null hypothesis. It means no significant difference occured in the results of the experimental and control groups, while they are examined for concepts not used in a G-TEC implementation. 3) Regarding the members of the experimental group, we use the t-test to compare their results for the (post-tests) concepts used in the implementation on one the one hand, and those not used in it on the other hand. The t-test gave a p-value=0.003. This value is lower than the defined alpha value; hence, the null hypothesis is rejected. This implies that the learners will obtain different results when they use G-TEC. Table 7 demonstrates that the mean scores of the experimental group for the Group A questions (0.56) are higher than theirs for the Group B questions(0.37); that is, learners are able to obtain better results when using G-TEC. We also investigate how many times the players played the NE. For each player, we have counted the number of situations in which they could play the NE, and the number of times that they have actually played the NE. As Table 8 shows, learners played the NE in 57 out of 74 rounds (77% of cases).
G-TEC satisfies the ARCS Model of Motivational Design Theories. According ARCS there are four steps for helping and satisfying motivation in the learning process: Attention, Relevance, Confidence, and Satisfaction. The way that the G-TEC meets these steps is outlined below. VOLUME 6, 2018 TABLE 8. Playing Nash Equilibrium: P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P 15 refer to player(learner) 1, player 2,· · · , player 15, respectively. In each concept, every single player can play NE by improving his learning or presenting a careful explanation. So, if a player cannot answer correctly to previous question and tries to answer correctly to current question, he/she is actually playing the NE. A pivot can play NE by explaining carefully and presenting a good explanation.
• Attention: we use score as a reward to encourage learners to active participation in mechanism and consequently to pay more attention to instructor teaching.
• Relevance: One solution to this criterion is that we have the learners who finish their work first to serve as tutors.
As we choose a volunteer to explain his/her answer, we prepare the situation to meet this criterion.
• Confidence: As we assign reward/punishment for correct/incorrect answer, the students know that their success is a direct result of the amount of effort they have put forth.
• Satisfaction: Rewarding is a tools of satisfaction and we use reward for more effort to present correct answer.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have provided a game with the purpose of enhancing learning using competitive learning and explanation. We have shown that the proposed mechanism has a positive impact on learning improvement. We have proven that with a reward (for correct answering) equal to or higher than three times the punishment (for incorrect answering), the strategy profiles (IC, GC) would be Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, the best response of the pivot is to present a useful and careful explanation, and then correctly answer the next question. Moreover, other players are encouraged to listen to the pivot's explanation carefully, and then answer the next question correctly. This is the very objective of G-TEC to get learners actively involved in the learning process. G-TEC is easy to implement, and players do not need any extra skills. We examined G-TEC with 15 learners as the experimental group and 12 learners as the control group.
The result of the t-test indicated that the proposed mechanism had positive effects on learning improvement.
There are still some remaining issues to be investigated regarding the proposed game. As discussed above, we used competitive learning because it is appropriate for improving analytical skills [2] such as mathematics. We also plan to investigate other types of learning materials, and potentially use different modes of playing.
As described in the presented mechanism, the questions were sorted from easy to hard. In future work, the mechanism could be improved by presenting an easier rather than a harder question when the number of correct answers is low. Table 9 indicates the payoff matrix of G-TEC for an iteration t. Actually, this table shows the normal form of game that was shown in Figure 3 . In this table the pivot is column player, and the row players are all other learners except pivot.
APPENDIX A
In each iteration t, R[t] and P[t]
stand for reward of correct answer and punishment of incorrect answer, respectively.
As we are going to solve this imperfect information game using normal form, the pure strategies of players consist of the Cartesian production of their information sets [49] . So the strategy set of pivot is {GCC, GCI , GIC, GII , BCC, BCI , BIC, BII } and the strategy set of P 1 is {CCC, CCI , CIC, CII , ICC, ICI , IIC, III }.
We can simplify the payoff matrix as Table 2 .
APPENDIX B
Considering the payoff matrix (Table 2) , it can be inferred that learning improves when the pivot chooses strategy GC and the other players select IC. For row players, IC is dominant strategy. For column players, the following condition makes the strategy GC as dominant strategies: 
We simplify the equation by naming N IC as x , and N C as y . We will then find the maximum value of We compute the partial derivatives to find the critical points. For the sake of presentation, we use f x as the first partial derivative and f xx as the second partial derivative of function f . Hence, (for x = 0, 0 ≤ y ≤ N ). As D > 0 and f xx < 0, hence, the function has a relative maximum at (0, 0 ≤ y ≤ n). Now to find the maximum value, we should find that in the bounded region (0 ≤ y ≤ N , and 0 ≤ x ≤ y) and its corners (Figure 8) . The boundary of the shape consists of three parts: 
On boundary 3 (x = y, 0 ≤ x, y ≤ N ): f (x, x) =
x−e x x , considering f (x, x) = 0, we can conclude that x = 1, and y = 1. Hence, the relative maximum value in boundary 3 is:
We also need to calculate the value of function at the corners:
From (5), (6), (7), (8) (We can write 
On the other hand, to increase players' motivation, the reward should be more than punishment in each iteration. But since in the proposed mechanism, the reward will decrease and the punishment will increase during iterations, it can be reasonably argued that the expected mean value of reward should be more than that of punishment during iteration. Hence, 
And the last condition is that:
Now we will find a feasible region to satisfy (9), (10), and (11) . Figure 9 shows the feasible region. So, for any value of R [1] and P [1] in the feasible region(R[1] ≥ 3P [1] and R [1] , P [1] ≥ 0) the strategy profiles (IC, GC) is Nash Equilibrium of G-TEC.
